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Abstract 
 
This article examines the nature of the restrictions on the underlying social welfare 
function that would appear to be required in order to justify the application of a 
“common” Value of Statistical Life (VSL) for any particular hazard within a given 
society and considers the way in which the magnitude of this common VSL might 
relate to the values actually employed in practice. The article also considers the 
question of whether, by contrast, discounts or premia might legitimately be applied to 
the VSL in order to take account of factors such as age or current exposure to risk and 
explores the form that such discounts or premia might reasonably take.  
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Valuing lives equally: defensible premise or unwarranted 
compromise? 
It is becoming increasingly common practice in developed countries for government 
agencies to employ willingness to pay (WTP) – based values of safety in allocative 
and regulatory decision making in a variety of contexts such as environmental 
protection, transport, food safety, flood risks, fire safety and so on.  For example in 
the USA the Environmental Protection Agency currently applies a WTP-based Value 
of  Statistical Life (VSL) in the region of $US 7.0 million and in the UK the 
Department of Transport, the Health and Safety Executive and other public sector 
agencies use a WTP-based VSL of roughly ₤1.5 million for all causes of death except 
cancer, where a value twice this size is applied. 
 
These WTP-based VSLs are essentially based on estimates of the relevant population 
arithmetic mean of individual marginal rates of substitution of wealth for risk of 
premature death by a given cause and are intended to reflect aggregate willingness to 
pay for small individual risk reductions which will reduce the mathematical 
expectation of premature deaths during a forthcoming period by precisely one - or, in 
the standard terminology, will “save one statistical life” - see, for example, Jones-Lee 
(1989) or Viscusi (1998).  
 
More specifically, suppose that a large group of n individuals is offered a safety 
improvement that will reduce the risk of death in a  particular type of  accident during 
the coming year by 1/n for each and every individual in the group. The mathematical 
expectation of lives saved by the safety improvement will therefore be precisely one. 
In addition, denote the ith individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk 
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of death in this type of accident during the coming year by mi. With n large (and 
hence 1/n small), aggregate willingness to pay for the safety improvement will then be 
well-approximated by ∑∑
==
=
n
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m , that is by the arithmetic mean of mi over 
the affected group. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to appreciate that the application of such WTP-based 
values is typically defended by an appeal to the ethical principles underpinning 
standard (unweighted) social cost-benefit analysis (i.e. the Kaldor-Hicks 
“Hypothetical Compensation Test”) or by application of a social welfare function 
containing distributional weights that effectively treat the marginal social welfare of 
income as being constant across all individuals in society so that a $1 gain or loss for 
a poor person is treated as having exactly the same impact on social welfare as the 
same gain or loss for a rich person – (see for example, Jones-Lee, 1989 p.33). 
 
Given  the well-established fact that safety is a normal good – see for example Jones-
Lee (1976, 1989), Miller (2000) or Viscusi and Aldy (2003) – it then inevitably 
follows that application of standard unweighted cost-benefit analysis (or a social 
welfare function displaying constant marginal social welfare of income) entails that 
the VSL applied in the appraisal of a safety project in a particular context (such as 
flooding) that will affect a given subset of the population should, in principle, reflect 
the per-capita income level of that subset, so that the VSL employed in assessing a 
flood safety project that will affect an area populated largely by the relatively well-off 
should exceed that applicable in the case of a less affluent locality.  Similarly, 
empirical evidence suggests that individual willingness to pay for safety may also 
show a tendency to vary with age, ceteris paribus.  Thus, for example, Jones-Lee et al 
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(1985) report the results of a UK stated-preference study indicating an inverted–U 
relationship, peaking in middle age, while Aldy and Viscusi (2007) derive a similar 
inverted–U relationship from US labor-market data.  While other evidence is less 
clear-cut on this issue – see, for example, Alberini et al (2002) or Krupnick (2007) – it 
would nonetheless appear to be the case that at least beyond middle years, willingness 
to pay for safety will tend to decline with age.  In view of this, standard unweighted 
cost-benefit analysis should strictly speaking also yield a lower WTP-based VSL for 
more elderly age groups. Indeed, the same sort of conclusion would apply to any other 
type of personal or cultural characteristic that tended to have a systematic influence 
on individual valuation of safety in any particular context, such as current exposure to 
risk. 
 
But, to the best of our knowledge, very few government agencies that employ 
willingness to pay-based values of safety actually differentiate between income 
groups (or age groups or any other type of groups) in this way1..Instead, for any given 
context – such as road transport – common values are typically applied across the 
whole of society, regardless of the income level, age-band or any other personal or 
cultural characteristics of the specific group affected by a particular public sector 
allocative or regulatory decision concerning safety2. 
                                                 
1
 One notable exception is apparently Health Canada which, according to Alberini et al (2002), applies 
a VSL equal to only 75% of its “standard” value to those aged 65 and over. In addition, in the UK at 
least some healthcare allocative decisions are based upon the so-called “Quality-Adjusted Life Year” 
(or “QALY”) methodology, together with a constant WTP-based value of a life-year. Strictly applied, 
this procedure will clearly also differentiate between patients on the basis of remaining life expectancy 
and hence age.  It is also worth noting that while the US Environmental Protection Agency gave 
serious consideration to the possibility of requiring age-adjustments to the VPF, this requirement was 
eventually dropped as a result of the controversy generated by the proposal. 
2
 This having been said, it should be stressed that in those countries that use WTP – based values of 
safety, some attempt is typically made to take account of the different degrees of fear or “dread” with 
which members of the public tend to view the prospect of death by different causes.  However the 
argument that follows focuses upon a single “homogenous” cause of death. 
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In spite of this tendency to apply a uniform VSL in any given context, so far as we are 
aware no satisfactory theoretical foundation has so far been provided that justifies the 
application of a common WTP-based VSL equal to, say, the overall population 
arithmetic mean of individual marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of wealth for risk 
of death by a given cause.  Admittedly, Bergstrom (1982) and Dehez and Drèze 
(1982) have developed conditions under which an overall “first-best” social optimum 
resource allocation will entail a VSL equal to the population arithmetic mean MRS, 
but these conditions involve a) that there are no restrictions on the nature of the tax 
levied on individuals to finance safety expenditure and b) more significantly, that 
individual risk reductions are uncorrelated with individual MRS. Clearly, if a safety 
improvement principally affects, say, a higher income group then – to the extent that 
safety is a normal good – as far as the whole of society is concerned, for this safety 
improvement individual risk reductions will be positively correlated with individual 
MRS. By contrast, if  members of a lower income group were the principal 
beneficiaries of the safety improvement, then the correlation would be negative. 
 
In turn, it might be supposed that a recent publication by Somanathan (2006) offers a 
satisfactory theoretical foundation for the application of a common WTP – based 
VSL, particularly as Somanthan’s note is entitled “Valuing lives equally: 
Distributional weights in welfare analysis”.  However, the axiomatic foundation 
underpinning Somanathan’s argument essentially requires (a) that all lives should be 
valued equally and (b) that monetary values of safety should reflect individual 
willingness to pay for it. On the basis of these axioms Somanathan reaches the 
conclusion that the social welfare function should take the form 
∑
=
=
n
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i
n1 )w(y
y),...yW(y , where yi is the ith individual’s income and w(yi) is the ith 
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individual’s willingness to pay for a given reduction in the risk of death, or as 
Somanathan puts it “the weights in this function are inversely proportional to the 
value of a statistical life for the person with income yi”. However, while fully 
acknowledging that Somanathan’s framework constitutes a useful starting point, we 
believe that it leaves three very important questions essentially unanswered. First, it 
provides no underlying rationale for the “equal monetary valuation” prescription, but 
instead quite literally treats the prescription as axiomatic. Second, it gives no 
indication of what the magnitude of the common VSL should actually be. That is, 
should the VSL in fact be the population arithmetic mean of individual marginal rates 
of substitution of wealth (or income) for risk; or the geometric mean; or what? And 
third, Somanathan’s argument takes no account of the fact that many reasonable 
people would argue in favour of the application of differentials to the VSL for a given 
cause of death to reflect factors such as the age of those affected by a safety 
improvement or their current exposure to risk of death by that cause. 
 
The purpose of the argument developed in the remainder of this paper is to address 
these three questions directly with a view to a) establishing what might in fact 
constitute a normative  rationale for the uniform monetary valuation of safety for any 
given type of risk; b) assessing the plausibility of this normative rationale; c) 
determining what the magnitude of the implied common VSL would actually be and 
d) examining the nature of the adjustments that it might be reasonable to make to the 
common VSL in order to take account of factors such as age or current exposure to 
risk. 
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1. The general case 
 
For the sake of simplicity, in the argument that follows it will be assumed that there is 
just one cause of premature death or, equivalently, that all causes of death are viewed 
with the same degree of “dread” by any given individual.   
 
Given this simplifying assumption, one can therefore talk unambiguously about an 
individual’s survival probability for a forthcoming period without the necessity to 
distinguish between the various different possible causes of death actually faced by 
the individual. Accordingly, consider a society of n individuals and suppose that the 
objective is to maximize a weighted-additive utilitarian social welfare function of the 
form: 
 
 V = )p,w(ua
1i
n
iiii
=
∑               (1) 
 
where V is an index of overall social welfare; ui(wi, pi) is the ith individual’s cardinal 
utility of wealth, wi, and survival probability, pi, for the forthcoming period and the ai 
are distributional weights.  As such, this is essentially the type of Benthamite 
utilitarian social welfare function proposed in Harsanyi (1955) and Broome (1991) 
 
Since the vast majority of  public sector allocative and regulatory decisions 
concerning safety will result in only very small (i.e. marginal) changes in individual 
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wealth or survival probability from their current “baseline” levels3 and  assuming that 
for all i, ui(wi,pi) is continuous and differentiable, it then follows immediately that the 
change in social welfare, δV, resulting from small changes in individual wealth, δwi 
and survival probability, iδp , will be well-approximated by: 
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Since, by definition, 
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∂∂ is the ith individual’s marginal rate of substitution, mi, 
of wealth for survival probability, equation (3) can, in turn, be re-written as: 
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The safety-valuation results implied by conventional social cost-benefit analysis 
would then follow if the distributional weights, ai , were set so as to ensure that  
w
V
i∂
∂
 
                                                 
3
 Thus, for example, with the U.K. average annual risk of a fatal road accident for an automobile driver 
or passenger lying in the region of 5 x 10
5−
 per annum and a roads VSL of about £1.5 x 106 , then even 
a 20% reduction in this road risk would involve an increase in survival probability of only about 1 x 
10
5−
 per annum (i.e. about 1% of the overall annual risk of death faced by the average 30 year old) and 
an average annual willingness to pay of no more than £15 (i.e. a minute fraction of average annual 
income). 
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was common across all i. In particular, given this condition, equation (4) then entails 
that 0δV > ( i.e. social welfare increases) if and only if∑ ∑
= =
−>
n
1i
n
1i
iii δwδpm . 
Assuming that a safety improvement that prevents one statistical fatality is financed 
by,  say, taxes or price increases so that ∑
=
−
n
1i
iδw equals the cost, C, of effecting the 
improvement, then setting the VSL equal to ∑
=
n
1i
iiδpm and requiring that VSL > C is 
equivalent to the necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in social welfare. 
The standard definition of the VSL then follows directly from this condition. 
 
But, suppose instead that the distributional weights, ai are set so that everyone’s 
marginal gain (or loss) in survival probability (rather than wealth) is treated equally in 
the sense that  
p
V
i∂
∂
 is  set at the same level for all individuals in society.  This would 
clearly require that the weights should satisfy the condition: 
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 determined by the current “baseline “ levels of iw  and ip
4
.   
 
                                                 
4
 Of course,  an alternative possibility would be that 
i
i
p
u
∂
∂
 was in fact independent of both iw  and ip , 
in which case equation (5) would entail that the ia  were constant for all variations in iw  and ip , 
rather than just for marginal variations. But this would require that iu ( iw , ip ) was both additive-
separable and linear in ip . In the case of an individual who was an expected utility maximizer this in 
turn would require that the utility of wealth conditional on survival exceeded the utility of wealth 
conditional on death by a constant amount that remained independent of wealth. While this might not 
be an entirely implausible assumption for an individual with dependents to support, it would seem to be 
rather less defensible for, say, a single individual with no dependents. 
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Proceeding on this basis and substituting from equation (5) into equation (4) then 
yields5 
 
δV  = .δpδw
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Next, consider a safety improvement financed by taxes or price increases borne by 
(possibly all) individuals in the society, but with only individuals i = 1, 2, …η (where 
η < n) enjoying an increase in survival probability, and in particular: 
 1iδp
1i
η
=
=
∑ .               (7) 
               
and 2,...n1,i  0,iδp ++== ηη .             (8) 
Thus, while all individuals in society may contribute to the financing of the safety 
improvement, but the latter affords only a subset of society an actual gain in survival 
probability (as may well in reality be the case), the safety improvement nonetheless 
involves the saving of one “statistical life”. For the sake of analytical simplicity, 
suppose that the safety improvement is, in fact, financed by taxes, 0t i ≥ , so that 
ii tδw −= (though it should be stressed that exactly the same results would follow if ti 
were taken to denote the effect of price increases, or time costs resulting from, say, 
legally imposed speed restrictions, or any other costs of the safety improvement borne 
by the ith individual). From equations (6), (7) and (8) it then follows that: 
                                                 
5
 Notice that as far as the treatment of ceteris paribus variations in wealth,  iδw , is concerned, 
equation (6) provides a rationale for the form of social welfare function postulated by Somanathan 
(2006) and discussed above. 
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so that the necessary and sufficient condition for the safety improvement to yield a 
gain in social welfare (i.e. 0δV > ) is: 
1
im
it
1i
n
<
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∑              (10) 
which, from the definition of covariance (denoted by “cov” in what follows), is 
equivalent to: 
1
ii mtn
−
 + n cov (ti, 1im − ) <1                                            (11) 
where it and 
1
im
− denote, respectively, the population arithmetic means of ti and 1im−  
respectively. 
In turn, (11) can be re-written as: 
n it < 1
im
1
−
(1 – n cov (ti, 1im−  )          (12) 
from which it follows immediately that since n it  is the total cost, C, of effecting the 
safety improvement, then the necessary and sufficient condition for the saving of one 
statistical life to result in a gain in social welfare is: 
    C < 1
im
1
−
(1 – n cov (ti,  1im− )).                  (13) 
But 1
im
1
−
 is, by definition, the population harmonic mean, mˆ , of mi, so that whatever 
the form of the tax structure used to finance a safety improvement and whichever sub-
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group in society actually benefits from the improvement, it follows from equation 
(13) that the appropriate Value of Statistical Life, VSL, is given by 6 
VSL =  mˆ (1- n cov (ti,  1im− )).           (14) 
 
More specifically, from equation (13) it follows that with the VSL set at this level, 
then any safety improvement which satisfies the condition that the cost per statistical 
life saved is less than the VSL will necessarily result in a gain in social welfare, 
regardless of the way in which the safety improvement is financed and regardless of 
which particular people actually benefit from it. 
Clearly, therefore, if the distributional weights, ai , in the weighted-additive social 
welfare function are specified so as to be inversely proportional to the marginal utility 
of survival probability (as required by equation (5)) then the implied VSL will indeed 
be the same, whichever subgroup in society actually benefits from a safety 
improvement.  However, while this does not appear to be an unduly restrictive 
condition to impose upon the social welfare function given that we are considering 
only marginal variations in pandw ii  from their current baseline levels, it should be 
stressed that it would require that the social welfare function was such that if pandw ii  
were to vary over time, then the weights ai , would also have to be adjusted so as to 
ensure that condition (5) continued to be satisfied.  It has to be conceded that this is a 
rather more demanding requirement, though arguably no more so than the condition 
underpinning standard social cost-benefit analysis (ie that the implicit distributional 
                                                 
6
 It has been suggested to us that as insofar as this definition differs from that which results from the 
conventional cost-benefit analysis methodology, we should not refer to it as the “VSL” but should 
accord it some other name. We disagree. The value specified in equation (14) is the appropriate value 
to place on a safety improvement that will prevent one statistical fatality, given the ethical prescription 
embodied in equation (5), and is therefore every bit as much a “VSL” as that which emerges from the 
ethical framework underpinning conventional social cost-benefit analysis. 
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weights should vary over time so as to ensure that the marginal social welfare of 
income or wealth remains constant). 
 
 
2. Specific policy implications 
 
The above argument demonstrates that with a social welfare function and 
distributional weights as specified in equations (1) and (5), for a given society and a 
given tax structure there will be a single willingness to pay-based VSL applicable in 
all cases independently of the overall level of wealth or indeed, any other 
characteristics of the particular group actually affected by a safety improvement.  
However, so far we have arrived at no conclusions concerning the way in which this 
VSL will relate to the population arithmetic mean, m , of individual marginal rates of 
substitution, mi, of wealth for survival probability.  Clearly, given that – as noted in 
the introduction – those countries that do employ WTP-based VSLs tend to employ 
figures based on the overall population arithmetic mean, m , it is a matter of some 
importance to establish how the “common” VSL specified in equation (14) actually 
relates to m . 
 
In order to proceed it will be assumed (a) that all individuals in society have positive 
wealth, i.e. wi > 0, i = 1,2,…n; (b) that there is some variation in wi across society; (c) 
that safety is a normal good, i.e.
i
i
w
m
∂
∂
 > 0 and (d) that the tax levied to finance a safety 
improvement is a non-decreasing function of wealth i.e. 
i
i
w
t
∂
∂
≥  0.  From these 
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assumptions it follows immediately that cov (ti, 1im− ) ≤  0 so that we can conclude 
from equation (14) that the “common” VSL will satisfy: 
VSL ≥  mˆ              (15) 
where it will be recalled that mˆ  denotes the population harmonic mean of mi.  
Furthermore, if a safety improvement is financed by a uniform per capita lump-sum 
tax, so that ti is constant – and hence cov (ti, 1im− )  = 0  - then from equation (14) we 
will have: 
VSL =  mˆ .             (16) 
 
Clearly, therefore, the harmonic mean of mi forms a lower bound to the possible 
levels at which the “common” VSL might legitimately be set and will indeed 
constitute the appropriate level for the VSL if (and, in fact  only if) a safety 
improvement is financed by a uniform lump-sum tax.  Furthermore, according to a 
celebrated theorem due to Augustin-Louis Cauchy, the harmonic mean is necessarily 
smaller than the arithmetic mean for a sample of non-constant, non-negative 
variables. 
 
But of course in most civilized societies one would expect that ti - far from being set 
at a constant level - would in fact be arranged to be an increasing function of income 
and hence wealth.  For the sake of analytical simplicity, let us therefore consider a 
situation in which: 
ti =  aiαw , α  > 0, a > 0.                                   (17) 
In addition, suppose that safety is not only a normal good but also that mi has a 
constant elasticity of income (and hence wealth), so that: 
 mi =  biβw  β >0, b>0.            (18) 
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From equations (10), (17) and (18) it then follows that the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a safety improvement that saves one statistical life to yield an increase in 
social welfare is:  
 1w
1i
n
β
α ba
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=
∑
−
            (19) 
which, on multiplying both sides of the inequality by biw 
a
iw  and rearranging, 
yields: 
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where aiw , biw and b-aiw denote the population arithmetic means of aiw , biw and b-aiw  
respectively. 
 
But from equation (17), Citn aiwnα ==  and from equation (18) β biw  = m , so that 
(20) can be re-written as: 
 










−ba
iw
b
iw
a
iw
 
_
m < C             (21) 
which entails that the “common” VSL is given by: 
 VSL =  m
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However, by definition: 
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Thus, with wi > 0,   i = 1, 2…n, a > 0 and b > 0 it will necessarily be the case that: 
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From equations (14), (22) and (25) it therefore follows that with a constant wealth 
elasticity of b > 0 for mi and a constant wealth elasticity of a > 0 for ti then: 
a = b  ⇒  VSL  = m ,          (26) 
a > b   ⇒  VSL > m ,           (27) 
and 
0<a<b.  ⇒  mˆ < VSL < m             (28) 
But of course it is natural to ask how the “common” VSL will actually relate 
quantitatively to m .  In order to answer this question it will clearly be necessary to 
make concrete assumptions concerning the specific magnitudes of the parameters a 
and b.  As far as b is concerned, recent surveys of the existing empirical literature by 
Miller (2000) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) suggest that the income elasticity of mi 
typically lies in the range 0.5 – 1.0.  Assuming that wealth is, broadly speaking, 
proportional to income, then it would also seem to be appropriate to assume that b 
typically lies within this range.  Turning to a, in the case of both the UK and the USA 
(at least as far as the Federal tax system is concerned) while income tax is 
progressive, it is also piecewise-linear.  However, approximating the piecewise-linear 
convex structures by the continuously differentiable form specified in equation (17), it 
transpires that while α  differs between the two countries, the parameter a is roughly 
equal to 1.5 in both cases, at least for income levels below the extreme upper tail of 
the income distributions. 
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It would therefore seem natural to examine the quantitative relationship between the 
“common” VSL and m  in each of three broadly plausible cases, namely: 
 
(i) a=1.5 and b = 0.5, (ii) a = 1.5 and b = 0.75 and (iii) a = 1.5 and b = 1.0. 
 
Using approximations to the UK and US income distributions, and again assuming 
that wealth is broadly proportional to income, it transpires from equation (14) that in 
both countries all three combinations of parameter values yield a “common” VSL that 
is no more than 10% larger than m .  It would therefore appear that, at least for the 
UK and USA, the application of a “common” VSL equal to the population arithmetic 
mean marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of death by a given cause will not 
involve a serious error relative to use of the figure implied by strict application of the 
argument developed in this paper. 
 
In turn, it is natural to wonder to what extent the lower-bound to the “common” VSL 
given by the population harmonic mean, mˆ (see equation (15)) will lie below the 
arithmetic mean, m .  If we take the income-elasticity of mi to be unity and assume 
that wealth is proportional to income, then the ratio 
m
mˆ
 will be equal to the ratio of the 
harmonic mean of income to the arithmetic mean.  For the UK and US income 
distributions this ratio is in the region of 0.85.  It is clear, therefore, that even if the 
“common” VSL were to lie at its lower bound – which for the sort of tax structure 
specified in equation (17) would require that a = 0 i.e. that the tax was a uniform 
lump-sum per capita figure – then the VSL would lie only 15% below m .  Again, this 
 19 
would hardly seem to constitute a substantial divergence from the commonly-used 
population arithmetic mean figure. 
 
3.  The effect of age and current survival probability. 
 
The argument developed so far indicates that if a formal justification is to be provided  
for applying a common VSL to all individuals in society that is independent of 
income, age or any other personal characteristic, then this would appear to require that 
the underlying social welfare function should be structured so as to yield the same 
marginal social welfare of a gain in survival probability for all individuals in society. 
 
However, quite apart from the fact that viewed from a long-term perspective this is a 
fairly stringent restriction to place upon the social welfare function, there are many 
who would argue that the marginal social welfare of a gain in survival probability 
should not be treated as being equal across all members of society and that, instead, 
the continued survival of the young should take precedence over that of more elderly 
people – see, for example Williams (2001) or Sunstein (2003).  
 
In addition, there is clearly a tendency in most civilized societies to devote greater 
effort and more resources to maintaining the survival of those who, as a result of 
injury or illness, face a high current risk of death or, equivalently, have a current level 
of survival probability which is low relative to that which is typical of their age-
group. Similar attitudes may also apply to other personal circumstances or 
characteristics. Such considerations clearly add another important ethical dimension 
to the problem addressed in this paper and the argument developed so far plainly 
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sheds no direct light on the issue. Nevertheless, we do believe that the  model 
developed above might well provide a potentially productive “reference point” and 
that modification of  equation (5) to allow some form of dependence of
ip
V
∂
∂
 on age, 
current survival probability or some other personal characteristic could prove to be a 
fruitful first step. In order to simplify matters, we will focus upon the influence of age 
adjustments, though with slight modification the argument would in principle apply to 
other factors, such as low levels of current survival probability resulting from  injury 
or illness. 
 
For illustrative purposes suppose that individuals in society can be partitioned into the 
“old” ( i  = 1,2,…η) and the “young”  ( i  = η +1, η +2,…n) and suppose that the 
distributional weights, ai, are such that the social “age-weightings” of gains in 
survival probability satisfy the condition: 1,2,...ηi   ,k
p
u
a 1
i
i
i ==∂
∂
 and 
2,...nη1,ηi   ,k
ip
iuia 2 ++==∂
∂
with 12 k  k > . In addition – again in the interests of 
simplicity – consider the case in which a safety improvement is financed by a uniform 
per capita lump-sum tax. A version of the argument presented in Section 1 then yields 
the result that if the safety improvement affects only the “old” (or, indeed some subset 
of this group) then the VSL will be strictly smaller than the population harmonic 
mean, mˆ , of mi, whereas if those who benefit from the safety improvement are 
exclusively from the “younger” subset of society then the VSL will exceed  mˆ and 
will, in fact, be precisely k2/k1 times larger than the VSL which is applicable when the 
safety improvement impacts only on the older group. However, as in the argument 
developed above in Sections 1 and 2, the appropriate VSL in each of these two cases 
 21 
will be quite independent of the distribution of income in society and, in particular, 
unrelated to the relative financial wellbeing of the “old” and the “young”. 
 
By contrast, suppose that the tax levied to finance the safety improvement satisfies 
condition (17) and that the marginal rates of substitution, mi, of wealth for survival 
probability satisfy condition (18) with, in addition, a = b. In this case, slight 
modification to the argument developed in Section 1 yields the result that the VSL for 
a safety improvement applying only to the “older” subset of society will be less than 
the population arithmetic mean, 
_
m , of mi, whereas that for a safety improvement 
affecting only the “younger” subset will exceed 
_
m  and will again be precisely k2/k1 
times the VSL which is applicable when it is only members of the “older” group who 
benefit from the improvement. Interestingly, it also transpires that if the safety 
improvement is split between the “older” and the “younger” subsets in proportion to 
the number of people in each group (so that the ratio of the number of statistical lives 
saved in the two groups is equal to 
ηn
η
−
) then the VSL will be equal to 
_
m , so that in 
this case the “standard practice” of applying a uniform VSL equal to 
_
m  would be 
quite appropriate, irrespective of the fact that k2 > k1. 
These results compare directly with those developed in Section 2 in which it will be 
recalled that with a uniform per capita lump-sum tax the “common” VSL was equal to 
the population harmonic mean, mˆ , while with ti and mi satisfying conditions (17) and 
(18) respectively and a = b, the “common” VSL was equal to the population 
arithmetic mean, 
_
m . 
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While the argument developed in this section has focused on the effect of age, it 
would clearly be a straightforward matter to modify the argument to take account of 
differences in the initial exposure to risk (or equivalently, differences in initial 
survival probability). For example, as a first step it would be natural to partition 
society into “high” and “low” risk subgroups and then apply the type of analysis 
outlined above. If so desired, one might then proceed to explore the implications of a 
finer sub-division. Similar comments apply to any other characteristic that might be 
considered relevant as a basis for applying discounts or premia to the calculation of 
safety. 
 
4.  Concluding comments. 
 
Under standard (unweighted) social cost-benefit analysis the so-called “VSL” or value 
accorded to a safety improvement that will prevent one “statistical fatality” (i.e. that 
will generate small individual risk reductions which reduce the mathematical 
expectation of the number of fatalities by one) is given by the arithmetic mean of 
individual marginal rates of substitution of wealth for the risk of death by the cause 
concerned, where this mean is taken over the group of people affected by the safety 
improvement. To the extent that these marginal rates of substitution will typically 
depend upon the income, age and other personal characteristics of those affected by 
the safety improvement, the logic underpinning standard social cost-benefit analysis 
would seem to require that the VSL employed in the evaluation of a safety 
improvement that affects a poorer (or more elderly) group in society should be 
smaller than the value applied to a wealthier (or less elderly) group. 
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But in those countries that do in fact use willingness-to-pay based values of safety, 
such differentiation is rarely applied by public sector agencies and instead a common 
VSL – independent of income, age, or other personal characteristics – is typically 
employed in the evaluation of safety projects in any particular context (such as road 
transport). 
Clearly, therefore, if a normative rationale is to be provided for this “uniform 
valuation of safety” approach then this will have to rely upon value judgments that 
differ somewhat from those underpinning conventional social cost-benefit analysis. 
This paper has sought to provide such a rationale and has demonstrated that, at least 
for small variations in wealth and the risk of death from their current levels, 
structuring the social welfare function so as to yield a common marginal social 
welfare of survival probability (rather than a common marginal social welfare of 
income or wealth, as under conventional cost-benefit analysis) does indeed generate a 
VSL that is independent of the income, age or other personal characteristics of the 
group affected, at least for a given cause of death. 
 
However, it has to be conceded that viewed as an ongoing requirement that continues 
to apply even as levels of wealth and survival probability vary over time, the 
“common marginal social welfare of survival probability” condition is – to say the 
least – fairly restrictive.  In addition, there are many who would argue that individual 
characteristics such as age or baseline risk should be allowed to influence the 
magnitude of the VSL applied to a particular group in society.  It then transpires that 
if the social welfare function is structured so as to accord, say, the survival probability 
of younger members of society more importance than that of older individuals, then 
not surprisingly the VSL for younger groups will exceed that applicable to older 
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groups, though the relevant values will again be unaffected by differences in income 
or personal characteristics other than age. Similar conclusions would clearly also 
follow if adjustments were made to the social welfare function to take account of 
differences in the current level of individual survival probability resulting from, say, 
injury or illness, rather than age. 
 
Finally, we would stress the fact that our aim in this paper has most certainly not been 
to advocate the application of a common VSL in practice, but rather to clarify the 
ethical underpinnings that would be required in order to justify the uniform valuation 
of safety for a given cause and to determine the magnitude of this common VSL. For 
what it is worth, our view is that while a persuasive normative case can probably be 
made for ensuring that the VSL employed by a public sector agency should be 
independent of the income or wealth of the sub-group in society that will actually be 
affected by the safety improvement, an equally persuasive argument can almost 
certainly be made for allowing some factors, such as the age or baseline exposure to 
risk of those affected, to have an influence on the magnitude of the VSL applied to a 
particular group. 
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